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22 November 1960



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

22 November 1960

DAILY BRIEF

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Communist China - USSR: After almost two weeks of high-level meetings in Moscow, Peiping continues to reiterate several basic Chinese positions in the Sino-Soviet controversy. A strong People's Daily editorial of 21 November uses the declaration which concluded similar meetings in 1957 to elaborate on Mao's "correct" assessment of the need for force in the present world situation. It implicitly criticizes Soviet overestimation of the strength of the imperialists, cites the continuing possibility of war, and emphasizes the danger from Communism's "main" enemy--revisionism. The appearance of this editorial while the meetings in Moscow are still under way suggests that the sessions have been prolonged by continued Chinese determination to get some of Peiping's hard-line views incorporated in the final communique. [REDACTED]

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Ethiopia: Discontent is widespread in the officer corps of the Imperial Bodyguard organization--Ethiopia's 6,000-man elite military unit. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] The Emperor is known to be concerned about discontent within the Bodyguard and can be expected to take early remedial action. On a previous occasion he met Bodyguard unrest by granting a bonus. The officers' dissension, however, also arises from alleged preferential treatment accorded other officer groups and may result in anti-regime activities if their complaints are not met. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

Japan. Prime Minister Ikeda's Liberal-Democratic party in the election on 20 November halted a steady decline since 1952 in the conservative representation in the lower, more powerful house of parliament. However, results of the election, which was marked by the lowest percentage of voter participation since 1947, reflect traditional voting patterns, satisfaction with present economic prosperity, and the improved efficiency of party organization rather than a strong mandate for Japan's pro-Western alignment. There was an increase, moreover, in the percentage of the popular vote received by the three parties which opposed the US-Japanese security arrangement. Prospects for a moderate opposition party in the near future dimmed as the Democratic Socialists lost heavily and the radical Socialists gained. The Communists made a slight gain in popular vote and increased their parliamentary representation from one to three. [REDACTED]

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Peiping Remains Firm on Issues in Dispute With Moscow

After almost two weeks of meetings attended by world Communist leaders in Moscow to resolve the Sino-Soviet dispute, Peiping continues publicly to reiterate several basic Chinese positions in the controversy. Using conclusions reached at a similar meeting of Communist parties in 1957 to support its arguments, a strong People's Daily editorial of 21 November elaborates on Mao's "correct" assessment of the need for a militant revolutionary line in the present world situation, implicitly criticizes Soviet overestimation of the strength of the imperialists, cites the continuing possibility of war, and emphasizes the danger from Communism's "main" enemy--revisionism.

Continuing what has become the central issue of the controversy in recent weeks, the editorial argues in effect that revolutionary methods must be promoted in any struggle for peace. In developing this thesis, the editorial declares that the balance of forces now is favorable for forceful seizure of power and that any view that overestimates the strength of the imperialists and underestimates the strength of the people is incorrect. Attacking the revisionists for having "deliberately stood things on their heads," the editorial argues that world peace can be guaranteed only by waging a joint struggle of all "peace" forces against the imperialists.

In direct contrast to these Chinese views, Soviet propaganda emphasizes the possibilities that socialism, under present conditions, may be achieved by peaceful means. As a prerequisite to such a peaceful transition, the USSR calls for the formation of a broad "democratic" alliance with nonproletarian and even bourgeois elements.

In a direct appeal to traditional Communist views, the Chinese editorial declares in conclusion that the "revolutionary spirit" is the "soul" of Marxism-Leninism and that to follow the revisionists is to "emasculate" this spirit. Appearing as it does while the meetings in Moscow are still under way, the editorial suggests that the sessions have been prolonged by Peiping's continued determination to get some of its hard-line views incorporated in the final communiqué.

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Discontent Reported in Elite Ethiopian Military Force

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The Emperor is known to be concerned about the discontent within the Bodyguard, which is the core of military support for the government, and he is expected to take early remedial action. Thus a revolt would appear unlikely at this time. The officers' dissension, however, may result in anti-regime activities if their complaints are not met. The Bodyguard is particularly formidable because it is well armed and strategically placed in the Addis Ababa area.

Within the Ethiopian military establishment there is considerable competition and ill feeling between the 6,000-man Imperial Bodyguard and the 24,000-man army. There is also friction within each service between older and usually poorly trained officers and the younger men who have received educations abroad or in Ethiopia's few military academies. Although pensioning off the over-age group would permit raising the salaries of younger men, it would probably create political difficulties for the Emperor by arousing the opposition of Ethiopia's powerful traditional leaders, who have been allied with the older officers.

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Japanese Electorate Returns Conservatives

As a result of the election on 20 November, Japanese Prime Minister Ikeda's Liberal-Democratic party (LDP) has halted a steady decline since 1952 in the conservative representation in the lower, more powerful house of the parliament, winning 296 seats as compared with 287 in 1958. With 96 percent of the popular vote counted, however, the party has failed to increase its popular vote over 1958.

Results of the election, which was marked by the lowest percentage of voter participation (73.5 percent) since 1947, reflect traditional voting patterns, satisfaction with present economic prosperity, and the improved efficiency of party organization rather than a mandate for Japan's pro-Western alignment. However, Toshio Tanaka, Socialist Diet member present during the demonstration against American presidential press secretary Hagerty last June, and Tokutaro Kitamura, a pro-Peiping conservative, were both defeated.

Prospects for a moderate opposition party in the near future dimmed as the representation of the moderate Democratic Socialist party (DSP), running in its first national election since it split from the Japanese Socialist party last January, fell from 40 to 17. Ikeda, who in an unprecedented move before the election had urged voters to support the DSP as a responsible opposition, interpreted the unexpectedly severe setback as a mandate for a polarized political system. DSP leaders, whose party now is threatened with extinction, admitted they had suffered a serious defeat and called a policy meeting for 25 November to discuss the party's future.

There was an increase, however, in the percentage of the popular vote received by the three opposition parties which opposed the US-Japanese security treaty. The radical Socialists gained at the DSP's expense, winning 145 seats as compared with the 122 they held at the dissolution of the last Diet, and the total Socialist vote increased slightly over 1958. The Communists, with 2.9 percent of the popular vote, won their largest vote since 1949 and increased their parliamentary representation from one to three.

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